Does Veikko Rantala Exist?

Pentti Määttänen

If you want to know whether a stone exists, kick it. This argument seems to be forceful, but the force is based on the assumption that pain is a more convincing proof of the existence of the stone than a mere visual or tactual perception. The intensity of perception does not, however, really solve the problem of scepticism which entertains serious doubt about the existence of the external world. Any act or operation performed for checking the issue (e.g., pinching oneself) can be a dreamed operation.
An act of kicking Veikko Rantala might produce indirect perceptual evidence of another experience of pain based on the yell of Veikko Rantala, but this doesn’t help either. Perception is always perception, and the perceptual world can always be interpreted to be a dreamed world - at least in principle.

Professor Rantala, on the other hand, might get angry and resort to measures described by C.S. Peirce, that is, he might just hit the sceptic down in which case the sceptic’s train of thought would suddenly and forcefully be interrupted. In this case the sceptic just might admit that something outside his ego has interfered, as Peirce believed, but you never know. (See C.S. Peirce, Collected Papers, passage 1.431.) It remains a problem whether this series of events still is a dreamed phenomenon.

A sceptic can always appeal to the apparent logical possibility that this is all just a dream. It is difficult if not impossible to find an internal contradiction in the thinking of a sceptic. It is difficult if not impossible to present a conceptual proof of the existence of the external world. How to make an inference from a concept to an external object? In what follows I shall, therefore, discuss the subject only from a practical point of view. If it is impossible to make a sceptic to admit that the external world exists, it is, however, possible to force the sceptic into an uncomfortable dilemma: either there is a serious incoherence between his/her theoretical scepticism and habits of action, or sceptical theories are in danger to be extinguished altogether.

The only premise of this practical argument is that also habits of action are accepted to be beliefs like in the pragmatism of C.S. Peirce. The sceptic’s system of beliefs consists of (at least) serious scepticism concerning the existence of the external world and, on the other hand, the habits of action of the sceptic. The sceptic can maintain that we live in a dream, but even the dreamed world contains the sceptic’s body and the dreamed habits of action (the case of bodiless spirits is, of course a logical possibility, but I don’t know how to discuss with them). The sceptic should have no reason to deny (before reading the practical argument) that also dreamed habits of action are beliefs.
Even in a dreamed world one can use the basic principle of pragmatism according to which knowledge can be achieved on the ground of perception and action. Perception gives some kind of knowledge also to a subject which stays still. A sceptic can sit in a rocking chair and be highly sceptical about the existence of the table in front of him/her. Does it disappear when the sceptic closes the eyes? Or is it there? How can one know?

The knowledge achieved on the ground of action is different. The knowledge is not directly about the perceived objects of the world, it is about the success of action. The world is only indirectly an object of knowledge. If a plan of action cannot be followed, then there is the possibility that some external and independent factors are responsible for this fact.
The logical structure of the situation is the same as in science according to the hypothetico-deductive conception of science. There are always several different theories which can explain a particular empirical result. In other words, a sentence describing the empirical phenomenon can be deduced from several different theories. Inference from the sentence to a theory is a reversion of deduction. Peirce called it abduction. An inference from a failure to act to a possible explanation of this failure (an external fact is one possibility) is an analogous procedure.

The sceptic who is sitting in a rocking chair eyes closed and in a serious angst concerning the existence of the table might infer (or at least that’s my recommendation) that if the table does not exist, s/he can walk through the place where the table a minute ago seemed to exist. If this highly important philosophical experiment is not successful, the sceptic might contemplate what is the best explanation of the fact that s/he cannot walk further. In principle the cause can be God’s finger, Frodo, neighbour’s bulldog or practically anything, but considering the circumstances the best explanation might just be - the table.
It is important to note that this is only one possible explanation. The object of knowledge is not the thing-in-itself but the results of own action and its success. Therefore I am not to be blamed for simple-minded metaphysical assumptions.

The sceptic’s dilemma is the following. The first horn is that the sceptic’s system of beliefs is incoherent. On one hand s/he entertains serious theoretical doubt concerning the existence of the external world, on the other hand s/he always acts on the assumption that the external world exists. This stand cannot be acceptable for a serious philosopher. The sceptic can, however, think about the other horn of the dilemma and get rid of this incoherence. Either by giving up theoretical scepticism, in which case there is one sceptic less in this world, or by behaving really sceptically also in practice.

David Hume already pondered (in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion) why indeed the sceptics always use the door and not the window when exiting a room. If this ingenious observation is combined with the basic ideas of pragmatism, we get the following practical argument.
The sceptic who seriously doubts the existence of the external world could quite well climb to the roof of the university and jump down. In a dream one can sometimes fly, as everyone knows. Why doesn’t the sceptic prove (in practice) that s/he can fly in this common dream, just once in a lifetime? This life is anyway more or less like a nightmare (hurricanes, earthquakes, monetarism, wars etc.). If the sceptic assumes that the probability of the existence of the external world is only 50 percent, why does s/he act with hundred-percent probability as if this world were real and not a dream? That is, it is absolutely certain that s/he does not jump.

Blaise Pascal made a bet about God’s existence. He thought that if one assumes that God exists, then one doesn’t loose anything but it is possible to win everything, the eternal life. This is not sound. It is evident that you have to live a godly life at least for a while in order to make this bet a realistic one. And anyone who reads just a couple of pages written by Kierkegaard might come to the conclusion that with godly life you might lose something. Pascal did no think through his case.
A bet that is based on the present practical argument is, however, waterproof. I am ready to make a bet (a bottle of brandy as a stake) with any sceptic that s/he doesn’t climb to the roof of the university and jump. If s/he does not jump, I win the bottle. If s/he jumps, I can anyway drink the bottle because there is nobody to collect it. Or shall we make a bet?
The question is: Why does the sceptic not jump?
The sceptic can offer several explanations for the fact. Weakness of will, headache, s/he is not in the mood for this kind of discussion just now, or this kind of vulgar argument is not intellectually interesting. S/he might even say that habits of action are not beliefs, after all (which is rather suspicious at this point of he argument).
Considering the circumstances the best explanation is that even in the sceptic’s habits of action there resides a pretty firm belief that the external world really exists. And the external world is even structured in a way that if the sceptic jumps, then s/he will meet something that some people call a sidewalk.
The argument is weak in the sense that is not a conceptual proof of the existence of the external world. It is, however, powerful in the sense that it effectively reduces the number of sceptics if they take their scepticism seriously. It is, strictly speaking, not only crushing but literally murderous argument against scepticism.

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I assume that Veikko Rantala exists and I hope that he doesn’t take scepticism too seriously.

Virtual reality as an experiential space

The notion of experiential space depends on how one understands experience. Crudely speaking we can distinguish between Cartesian conception of mind and experience and a naturalistic conception. René Descartes separated the mind from the body and the culture from the nature. Mind and its content, ideas, form a specific mode of being, immaterial substance. Experience is sense-experience, the eye connects the mind and the external world. This conception has been influential hundreds of years, and certain Cartesian background assumptions are still present in contemporary psychology and cognitive science. Anti-Cartesian naturalism, on the other hand, considers mind and culture as capacities of biological organisms which are in constant interaction with the natural and cultural environment. Mind is necessarily embodied.

It has been maintained that virtual reality, which has become a topic of discussion after the development of computer technology, revives Cartesian ontology. From a naturalistic point of view, there is no need to revive outdated metaphysical notions at the age of computer technology. In order to see this we must, however, consider the notion of experience. Cartesian ontology is closely related to the conception of experience as sense-experience, perception. The basic idea of pragmatism is to widen the concept of experience: the role of action and practice must be taken into account. Virtual reality as an experiential space is, accordingly, analysed differently in these two approaches.

Experiential space

From the Cartesian viewpoint space is geometrical space, absolute and independent of empirical matters. Experience as sense-experience allows for visual perspective. As mind is separated from the body, experienced space as perceived space is separated from the material world, physical space. To give this space the status of virtual reality is, indeed, a kind of Cartesian view. The problem is why should anybody take seriously this kind of metaphysics. The character of the experience produced with the aid of new technology is not a sufficient reason for accepting this view.

The pragmatist notion of experiential space is different. According to Charles Peirce beliefs are not immaterial entities in an immaterial mind but habits of action. A crude example: most of us have the habit of exiting a room through the door, no the window. This habit is, in itself, a sort of belief about the structure of the physical world. On the other hand, the physical pace is experienced through action. The role of vision is to help in anticipation of the results of different courses of action and thus to help in making reasonable plans of behaviour. Experiential space is not separated from the physical space. On the contrary, the physical space is experienced by a physical entity, a biological organism, which is continuously interacting with its environment. The use of natural languages and other symbolic means does not change this fact. Words and other sign-vehicles are physical entities, too.

Henry Lefebvre maintains a similar kind of anti-Cartesian view. He distinguishes between physical, mental and social space but these are not separated from each other. Mental and social spaces are projected onto the physical space. This projection takes place when physical entities in the physical space are perceived as meaningful entities. The result is an experiential space that has different intertwined layers: physical, mental and social. The social space is experienced through social practice that is not only speaking and writing. Lefebvre looks for a spatial code that allows for a social practice that is at the same time spatial practice. Meaning as linguistic meaning is not enough for this. The semiotic approach of Peirce is an obvious candidate for a theory of meaning that is suitable for this purpose.

Peircean semiotics

Peircean sign is a three-place relation between a sign-vehicle, object and interpretant. The sign-vehicle refers to its object in virtue of the interpretant. There are different interpretants but the most interesting one is the final interpretant, habit of action. Any entity can be a part of some sign-relation. A door is interpreted to be meaningful through habits of exiting a room. A banana is interpreted to be an edible object through habits of eating. And, of course, there are social and cultural habits. The point is, as in Lefebvre’s theory, that meanings are not necessarily linguistic and that interpretation takes place, ultimately, through action, that is, spatial practice.

Cognition is, according to Peircean pragmatism, basically anticipation of future action, bodily movements in physical space and/or producing different kinds of sign-vehicles. This entails that the experiential space is a space of potential activities. Objects are interpreted to be meaningful as objects of action. Perception is not enough to explain our interaction with the environment.

Digital surface

Different conceptions of experience amount to different conceptions of pictures, surfaces. Cartesian conception of experience as perception fits in with the view that pictures are projected to retina, and retinal images are somehow transferred to mental images that correspond to physical pictures, surfaces. From a pragmatist point of view this is just a metaphor. It can be questioned, following Jan Kenneth Weckman, whether an image is a physical entity at all. A physical picture, the flat object on the wall, is not an image before it is experienced. Mental images and perceived images exist in the same way. Images exist in actual or potential interaction.

Digital surface is no exception. It is not enough to characterize it as a physical surface produced with digital equipment. All perceived objects, even paintings, are interpreted in terms of meanings that are, ultimately, practical. When looking at a painting we are not in front of a flat physical entity. We are in an imagined experiential world that we have constructed on the basis of interpretation.

The nature of contemporary digital devices actually forces us to move away from the Cartesian framework. Perception is not passive reception of causal effects from the environment. Visual input is guided by movements of the head and the movements of the body in actual environment. Movements are also accompanied with proper tactual input and so on. In other words, perception is connected to action, to our practical relation to the world. Digital surface is, in this context, better characterized as our interface to the reality.

The concept of reality can be understood in different ways. Peirce wrote about hard facts, muscular effort and resistance. Hard facts are compelling. We have to adapt our behaviour to hard facts if we are to proceed in a successful way. Our habit of exiting rooms through the door and not the window is dictated by hard facts. We are physical entities in a physical world.

On the other hand it is possible to maintain that we adapt our behaviour to other kind of facts. If we all believe that Santa Claus lives in Finland and gives presents only to decent people, this belief will probably have an effect on our behaviour (supposing that we want presents). The value of money is similarly based only on the fact that sufficiently many people think that a bill, for example, has a certain value. These facts guide our behaviour and can thus be said to be real facts. The difference between these facts and hard facts might be expressed by naming them soft facts.

We are in contact with hard facts by muscular effort and resistance, but soft facts are facts of our mutual beliefs only. Soft facts are anticipated behaviour of people in social context. In a sense, the social reality consists of soft facts. Soft facts are real also in the sense that they are in a certain interplay with hard facts. Soft facts are conventional. We can, in a society, choose what side of the road we drive, but after the choice anyone driving the wrong side will probably have to deal with some hard facts.

In Lefebvre’s terms, the social space is projected onto the physical space in that the physical entities perceived in the space convey social meanings, which are about how people will behave in relation to those entities. The social space is virtual in the sense that it consists of soft facts, not of hard facts. Physical hard facts are perceived but social soft facts are conceived, anticipated. However, the social space is perfectly real in the sense that habits and practices are realized as actual behaviour of physical entities, biological organisms. The social space is real but abstract, in the sense that it is only thought of, anticipated.

Social practice consists of two types of human behaviour, symbolic practice like speaking and writing and concrete external practice like bodily movements, use of tools and machines, constructing roads, buildings and so on. Soft facts have an effect on concrete external practice that changes physical environment, changes hard facts. Soft and hard, culture and nature cannot be separated from each other just like mind and body cannot be separated from each other.

Virtual reality

Virtual reality is a concept used in context of new computer technology. The “real” reality is, for example, a laboratory environment where someone wears a helmet and other stuff. This equipment produces perceptions that make the person to have an experience that s/he is in some other environment. This perceived environment is then called virtual reality in contrast to the real laboratory environment where s/he actually is.

The difference to seeing a movie, for example, is only in how much the person having these experiences feels to be embedded in the perceived situation. Actually there is a continuum that starts from reading a book, looking at pictures, movies and continuing with helmets and other equipment. Movements and external operations are added (perhaps some time in the future) so that muscular effort and resistance produce the experience of dealing with actual (in contrast to virtual) physical objects. In the other end there is, thus, a situation where a group of people behaves in a virtual environment and have same kind of perceptual experiences as they would have in a real environment.

Where is the difference between that virtual reality and our actual, “real” reality? Only in the fact that the group believes that somebody can switch the power off. But that can happen here too, the methods just are slightly different.

The use of the concept ‘virtual reality’ is justified in the context where a person knows that his/her body is in a lab but the perceived world looks like something else. However, the perceived world is ultimately interpreted in terms of potential action, bodily behaviour. The only reality that anyone can experience as reality is that reality where s/he is bodily embedded. Other “realities” are more or less imagined, anticipated, fictive.

What from the Cartesian viewpoint might be a reality in itself, something that is real only because it is perceived (Cartesian view of experience), is actually only a sign about what might be experienced (according to a pragmatist view of experience), that is, might be an object of perception and action.

Different notions of experience lead to different conceptions of virtual reality. From a pragmatist viewpoint, the world that is experienced in a computer lab is a world of anticipated action, and its mode of existence is the same as the world of soft facts, the social space.

Modern and postmodern

Descartes is one of the founders of modern thinking in philosophy. One way to define postmodern, at least in philosophy, is to give this label to systematic criticism of Cartesian assumptions. Typical features of postmodern thinking that follow from this approach are at least the following: Mind is necessarily embodied; there is no separation between nature and culture, the concept of experience is wider than that of sense-experience and there is no absolute fundament for knowledge. The pragmatist approach described above is an example of this type of thinking.

One of the main features of postmodern thinking is the conception that it is impossible to give clear and precise definitions to all issues, including postmodernism itself. Especially this holds for any attempt to define precisely the concept modern art or postmodern art. Some remarks are, however, possible in the context of the present topic, digital surface.

Modernist (Cartesian) conception of experience fits well in with the view that a flat surface on the wall is a, or the, work of art that people go to admire in museums and galleries. The object of aesthetic evaluation is a physical picture. Experience as perception creates a mental image in the mind (in the head). Aesthetic experience and evaluation is typically based on transcendental principles and non-practical disinterestedness.

A postmodern conception of experience maintains that action and practice are epistemologically significant. The surface gets practical depth because the means of interpretation cannot be separated from action, social and spatial practice. Aesthetic experience is not separated from life, and disinterested motives are not understood to be based on transcendental or quasireligious principles. Aesthetic values as well as ethical values are discussed in the context of life. This may be called postmodern thinking, but this doesn’t mean that it is entirely new thinking. After all, it was Aristotle who laid down this kind of principles. Generally speaking, one guiding principle is to put all things in context, social, cultural and historical context.

Postmodern thinking denies the categorical separation of nature and culture. One way to express this and realise this is to develop a notion of meaning that is not restricted to linguistic meaning. Postmodern features in art may well reflect and express this kind of ideas. Clear and distinct borderlines are distorted, social and spatial practice has its effects on the physical space as well as on the practice of making representations. One of Lefebvre’s examples is about the invention of perspective which is one feature of modern art. According to Lefebvre spatial social practice, that is, building of new kind of towns instead of typical medieval towns created the perspective before the eyes of the artists. They just transferred it on painted surfaces.

Does contemporary social practice have any effect on making representations, making art? One important element of contemporary social practice is without doubt the internet, which is sometimes called the postmodern object. Artworks in the internet may thus be characterized as postmodern, also in the sense that in presenting artworks this is one way of making a distance to museums and galleries, which are important in the tradition of modernism. Internet is an element of our interface to the world, but even it does not change the fact that we are, basically, moving pieces of flesh in a physical environment. Cognition is embodied, and that what we experience as real is rooted in the body.

Literature

Lefebvre, Henry The Production of Space, Blackwell, Oxford 1991.
Peirce, Charles Philosophical Writings of Peirce, Dover, New York 1955.