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If existing literature cannot provide a solution to the problem, the researcher himself has to look into the matter by studying the empirical object. Empirical research is usually so time consuming and expensive that before settling down to work, one should give the logic of the work a great deal of thought. We no longer think like Descartes, who thought that there was only one "method of science", and by using this method, all the problems could be solved. Instead, several alternative approaches to problems will be presented below. The choice between them will depend primarily on the goal of the study.
The most common goal of empirical research is to gather information on the object of study. We call theory all the knowledge that has been accumulated through many research projects. The diagram on the right illustrates the idea of gathering data or information on a study object which resides in the empirical world. The data are collected, processed, and then added to the collective structure of all theories; they are not used for making improvements to the object or its
environment. Indeed, many scientists think that this informative approach is the only acceptable way of doing research: the scientist should by all means avoid disturbing the object, as this would of necessity corrupt the data so that they do not any more give a true picture of the object.
However, there are alternative styles of research where the prime objective is not to keep intact the object, but on the contrary to improve it by removing a practical problem or by developing a new product, for example. This normative approach is illustrated in the diagram on the left. It may also, as a secondary result, augment existing scientific theories. Its philosophy is discussed on the page Normative Analysis.
Let us have a closer look at the nature of the information a research project strives for. A century ago, some researchers thought that science should only aim at explicit, definite, and exact knowledge. If a research project cannot report such positive knowledge, it is better to publish nothing, said these supporters of the "positivistic" school of thought, for example Wittgenstein (B): "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent."
However, in closer inspection it turns out that the positivistic ideal is attainable only in some areas of research. Restricting our studies to just those things that we can exactly measure would mean denying ourselves many of the benefits of research. For example, forecasting weather is quite useful even if uncertain.
Particularly when we are speaking about the research and development of artifacts we should note that artifacts are made on the basis of not only explicit and exact knowledge, but also on that of tacit knowledge. This knowledge could also be called know how, competence, proficiency, or skill, and what is typical of it is that we use it without making it explicit. The researcher may try to gather and clarify the artisan's tacit knowledge, but it is never possible to put all that knowledge into words, and the researcher has to accept this fact.
Knowledge and opinion are no opposites. Instead we could regard them as statements which can be placed on a continuum depending on the number of people who support them. Let us consider the following statements made by various people:
The first piece of information is an example of objective knowledge. The measurement does not depend on the person doing it and we can say that the statement is true (or false). Measurements may differ a little, but we call it random variation and it does not interest us. Normally we eliminate the variation by calculating the mean of measurements.
The second statement is clearly a subjective opinion; there are not many people who would subscribe it. Nevertheless, it is a fact that at least one person has such an opinion, and this state of things can be studied objectively.
The third statement is an intermediate case. It would be regarded as an appropriate opinion, perhaps even as a true statement, by almost all Europeans but not by all the people in the world. This type might be called an "intersubjective opinion".
Objective knowledge has been the primary target of scientists from antiquity until now. Subjective (and intersubjective) opinions were long regarded as too fluctuant objects for serious study. They started to interest researchers first when industry needed them as a basis for the design of products for people. Today we understand that we can study subjective opinions in a perfectly objective manner. In their study there are two main lines:
The researcher's own opinions. The discussion above concerns the input material of an empirical study. Another question then is what the researcher finds and asserts about empiria and particularly about the object of study. The general principle is that the researcher should report what he has found in empiria but he should not add evaluative opinions of his own. This concerns even normative research which should only sum up those opinions on future development that exist in the sources.
The knowledge that we have about any object of study (in scientific research as well as in everyday life) belongs to either one of the following two groups:
Humanistic sciences operate often with the first type, and technological sciences with the second type of knowledge, see Two Cultures of Research. It is difficult to reach both goals simultaneously because one of them stresses unique features and the other general ones. This is, however, what a researcher often must attempt, if the target is to study both artifacts and their meaning to all their users.
Methodologically the study of specific cases or events (Case Study) is not very complicated and it does not much differ from our everyday explorations. As a contrast, the inquiry into those patterns which are similar from case to case is much more sophisticated and necessitates often several successive operations of analysis.
Let us note initially that those patterns or characteristics which are common to several or all cases in the material of study, in other words patterns which do not vary, are called invariances. There are two important types of invariance:
These two types of invariance are no opposites. The difference between them is only that dynamic invariances contain time as one of the variables. This difference, however, multiplies the amount of data to be analyzed and often necessitates particular research methods in these so called diachronic studies, in contrast to the synchronic or "cross-sectional" study of static invariances.
Traditionally researchers have been most interested in invariances which describe objectively measurable facts, but nothing prevents to apply the concept of invariance even to subjective opinions, despite their fluctuating nature.
Another useful angle of viewing research projects is the logical art of
the resulting knowledge. In research reports, the most usual variety of
knowledge is a description of the object.
The purpose of
description is usually to answer the question what, in so concise a
way as possible and including only the relevant attributes,
whatever they may be in each project. Usually most interesting are the
invariable attributes which are valid in a large number of cases if
not universally.
Often (but not always) the researcher wishes to continue the project to a deeper level than just description: he wants to know why the object is such as it is. Finding the reasons, or explaining the phenomenon, can be done in a number of ways where the reasons are fetched either from the concurrent context of the phenomenon, or from the past or alternatively from the future. In the following are some examples; the list is not exhaustive.
The prevalent style of explanation is a little different in humanistic sciences and in the natural (or technological) ones. In the latter, causal explanation is the rule. In fact, the paradigms of humanistic and technological sciences are so different that you could speak about two cultures of research. However, the division is regrettable from the viewpoint of the researcher of artifacts who normally has to deal with both inanimate objects and people using the objects.
All three styles of explanation can be used in two situations:
In any case, a plausible explanation is expected to fulfil the following requirements:
We should not exaggerate the difference between description and explanation. They are no opposites but rather they are two slightly different views at the object of study. Examples of these two styles of study can be found in Descriptive History and respectively History That Explains. Some philosophers of science have wanted to see them as two subsequent phases in the process of understanding the object: you should thus first describe the object, and finally you can expect to arrive at the moment of "Eureka", at the revelation which explains all the initially perplexing details amassed during the phase of description.
Such a dramatic progression up till "Eureka" is easily feasible when writing the final report of the study where it certainly can heighten the interest of the public in the same way as the study of a work of art become more interesting when it can progress as a gradual comprehension of the work. However, in factual research such a progression from description to explanation cannot be taken as a general rule. On the contrary, it is usual that a researcher starts from a tentative explanation, a preliminary understanding of the relationships contained in the object, and on this basis he then defines the descriptive facts that he shall start to collect.
Neither descriptive nor explaining-type research aim at ameliorating its object directly, that is: during the research project. On the contrary, many researchers think that ideally the study should incite no changes in the object; in this way one also would get most reliable findings. This is the principle of "strenge Wissenschaft", "rigorous science" which is, however, more an ideal than real practice in most fields of research.
Beside descriptive and explaining-type studies which avoid influencing their object, there is also another style of research, where the final target is to influence and guide factual development. This is the normative type of science. Earlier it was often called "applied science" because it applies the findings of descriptive research which provide the grounds and show alternative means to steer evolution. In this respect, causal explanations are of special value. If we know the dynamic invariances and causes of change, we can often manipulate these causes and bring about those empirical changes that are necessary, cf. Design Theory.
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September 11, 2005. Original location:
http://www2.uiah.fi/projects/metodi
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