Diachronic View on Arteology

1. Logic of Natural Development
2. Logic of Deliberate Development
3. Progress of a Branch of Science

{On various pages of the present site is given a cross-sectional or synchronic view on the present field of arteological research and theory.} However, a cross-section can give no complete picture of the topic, because theories are not static. Some of them have existed since antiquity, and we know that they have developed continually, as well as has the design of products.

Fortunately, we have a plentiful collection of documents from various times, both on the theories of design and on the ensuing products. Moreover, many ancient products have survived. We have thus good chances to study design and its theory in a diachronic, or historical view, and so has indeed been done already in many profound treatises under the labels of History of Science, respectively Art History. Such a study helps us to understand why our object of study is as it is today, and it can help us to prepare ourselves for foreseeable changes in the future.

Logic of Natural Development

To help understanding the role of design theory in modern product development, we start by taking a brief historical look at the traditional way of designing products without the help from any explicit theory.

Man has always been compelled to adapt his activity and his belongings to the changing requirements of the environment. We may well assume that in the earliest times, these changes were made almost instinctively. Moreover, as most people lived in families and tribes, the younger members of the community had access to an abundant source of experience: the tacit wisdom stored in the memories of their elders and accumulated in the models of design of all artifacts which followed tradition (fig. on the right).

Tradition was often quite rigid, and people were reluctant to diverge from it when making new products. A diversion could only be made if people felt strong enough need for it. Christopher Alexander gives a beautiful description of how tradition could be developed (1964 p.46):

"Form-builders will only introduce changes under strong compulsion where there are powerful (and obvious) irritations in the existing forms which demand correction ... Adaptation depends on the simple fact that the process toward equilibrium is irreversible. Misfit provides an incentive to change; good fit provides none. In theory the process is eventually bound to reach the equilibrium of well-fitting forms. ...

However, for the fit to occur in practice, one vital condition must be satisfied. It must have time to happen. The process must be able to achieve its equilibrium before the next culture change upsets it again."

The development of tradition is normally incremental: it mainly consists of just small diversions from the original model. After a tentative change is made, the result will be scrutinized and judged either better or worse than the original. If it is not deemed satisfactory, new attempts are made until a good "fit" is found. The method is called iteration (lat. iterum, "anew").

The iterative method has a few weaknesses. While iteration usually leads to a better solution, it may nevertheless fail to find the best alternative of all.
An example of this is illustrated in the figure on the left: if the iteration process is started at option A, it will eventually lead to alternative C. This is however only a partial optimum: while it is certainly better than the neighbours, it is far from the absolute optimum S, which is radically different and could never have been found by iteration only. Indeed, it is a fact that the old unconscious and iterative way along which tradition developed, hardly ever gave rise to principally new solutions. Obviously, if you consider only alternatives that do not differ much from the old one you never invent something radically new.

Another weakness of the iteration method is that it can effectively optimize only one feature of the object at a time. If you have several alternatives which diverge from the old model, and from each other, in more than one respect, you will find it impossible to compare and rank order them with the iterative method. Iteration works well if the differences between alternatives concern no more than one property of the objects, otherwise it may lead in the wrong direction.

Successful development of tradition is thus possible only if three conditions are met:

• no more than one aspect of the artifact need to be improved
• no more than incremental changes are needed, and
• there is enough time to complete the process of development before another revision must be initiated. Note that the process may need repeated cycles of new design proposals and their assessment, before a satisfying solution is found.

These conditions are seldom fulfilled in modern society, consequently the average craftsman can seldom use tradition as a basis when designing a new product. As a contrast, a professional designer sometimes can still exploit the traditions of his profession. The reason is that a modern, schooled designer is used to theoretical thinking and thus can assess which elements of tradition are obsolete and which are still serviceable when designing a new product.

An amusing account of exemplar-based education in the traditional method of "masters and apprentices" is given by Yona Friedman, 1975, figure on the left:

"Learning is dispensed by "masters," who have their own special tricks [of trade] which are usually impossible to communicate. Even though they can use them, they can't teach them. Masters are surrounded, therefore, by apprentices who do their best to imitate their master's working style, hoping by one means or another to pick up his "touch."
I call such disciplines the prenticeable disciplines."

Logic of Deliberate Development

As a contrast to the traditional method, Friedman explains the method of "scientific education", figure on the right:

"But there are other disciplines, for the most part called sciences, in which ... schools operate according to an arsenal of rules, which are available to the public... Anybody who reads and understands these rules can apply them himself, without having to imitate the masters; and once he understands them, he can communicate them to anyone else. They are stated in such a way that in any instance it is clear whether they apply or not.
I call these the teachable disciplines."

The modern innovators can base their designs not only on earlier products and on the experiences from their use, but also on something very powerful: theoretical models of the products. Models can provide grounds for completely new solutions, grounds for evaluating them and for developing them until a variant which fulfils all the simultaneous requirements is found (fig. on the left).

Constructing a theoretical model for a practical product or its use is often difficult enough, and it was probably seldom done during the era of traditional craftsmen. However, in modern society there are specialists in the making and use of theoretical models: researchers. When such specialists are invited to take part in the process, it means starting a deliberate development project which calls for special methods.

The idea of inviting academic researchers to assist in industrial development is relatively new. Before the industrial revolution, most research was done in universities, and their researchers were not really interested in the development of practical activities. These latter were classified as part of the management of industry and crafts, which activities were often considered less intellectual and less valuable than "pure" thinking and erudition. This order of values was a legacy dating back to antiquity, when industry and all practical work was delegated to slaves and servants.

In antiquity, few classical philosophers had anything to say on how to develop a practical skill. Aristotle, however, made a passing remark in which he classified sciences into two groups: higher theoretical sciences which search for the truth; and practical sciences which aim at helping and steering man's activities. Examples of the latter were ethics, politics and economy. It is quite astounding that neither Aristotle nor any other known philosopher said a word on the thriving practical sciences in Greece: the medicine of Hippocrates, the physics of Archimedes, or the construction science of Vitruve.

However, even without any help from academic philosophy, the skills and traditions of the various handicrafts gradually improved. During the Middle Ages, the handicraft arts became organized into the various guilds, and most of these wanted to keep the accumulated skill and tradition as precious secrets of the guild. Because few masters were able to read or write, the knowledge was mostly conserved as tacit know how, and most of it has now vanished. Anyhow, the masters knew the value of tradition well, and knew also their own authority as keepers of the knowledge of tradition. It is apparent in the speech of architect Jean Mignot arriving in the year 1400 to teach the unfortunate masons of the Milan cathedral, whose vaults were about to collapse:

Ars sine scientia nihil est. "Skill without knowledge is of no value."

Francis Bacon (1561 - 1626) and Galileo Galilei (1564 - 1642) were the first philosophers to seriously contemplate the logic of the "practical sciences". Eventually it became clear that research could help us to reach goals of two types:

• informative {(or "disinterested") research seeks knowledge, and
• normative research tries to steer or help human activities.}

From the findings of informative research we cannot directly proceed to normative recommendations. "From what is, does not follow what should be" says the axiom sometimes called "Hume's Guillotine". (David Hume, 1711 - 1776.) Between description and norm we need an intermediate phase of human evaluation which may lead to different conclusions depending on who makes the assessment.

{It took quite a long time before philosophers were able to clarify the logical relation between informative and normative science.} Auguste Comte (1798 - 1857) combined the various goals of science in one sentence: savoir pour prévoir pour pouvoir - knowledge helps us to predict and thus to influence. {Many philosophers wanted to see research projects as links in a chain where information flows gradually from basic research to practical application. This chain would consist of three types of research projects:}

1. basic research which gathers knowledge without aiming at any practical goals (e.g. in medicine: studying a disease without aiming at curing it)
2. applied research would show which useful "applications" are possible (e.g. trying to find cures for a disease, based on the knowledge gathered about it)
3. development would spur "applications" in the real world (e.g. by starting the industrial production of a healing drug).

However, modern empirical study of what really happens between researchers, financiers and industry co-operating in development has shown that that such chains starting at basic research and ending at application are not at all common in real life. Factually, most technological developments originate not in basic research but in the practical (or assumed) needs of customers, or sometimes in an innovation made in the workshop. After this incentive, the theoretical aspects may then be investigated, clarified, or refined by researchers, but this happens only when industrial management deems it necessary.

Is there any model, then, typical of modern industrial development? Many researchers have hoped to find it by studying the flagship of modern progress, technology. In 1965, de Solla Price published his paper, Is Technology Historically Independent of Science? In 1966, several famous philosophers united in writing Towards a Philosophy of Technology; 1969 Herbert A. Simon wrote an important book, The Sciences of the Artificial. After that, research and seminar reports have appeared at least annually, and today the logic in the development of modern engineering science is well documented.

{Above was given a short account of the principal philosophical deliberations that have provided the basis of the present site of arteology. Gathering the material for this site and finding a suitable structure for it took several years, which process is documented on the page How Arteology was born.

It seems today that the traditional division between basic research, applied research, and development, can give no fertile basis for the study of products and production. On this site of arteology we instead use another division of research activities which is based on the principal goals of research projects:

• Informative research of objective facts. This basic research does not search immediate applications or profits. Histories of product types are often of this sort, likewise anthropological, sociological and psychological studies of the uses of products.
• Normative study of the values, needs and goals of people, and of the ways of fulfilling them and removing existing practical problems. There are two typical situations when normative research is called for:
  • General or "nomothetic"studies of what all people expect of products and their use. This science of design aims at creating universally applicable theories of design. Its methods are examined in more detail on the page Theory of Design.
  • Project-specific or "idiographic" studies assisting the creation of a single new product. Typical approaches of these are explained on the pages Developing a Product and Artistic Research.

In the following we shall compare the historical evolution of arteology with the normal patterns in the evolution of other branches of science, and attempt to make a modest forecast for the imminent future of arteology.}

Progress of a Branch of Science

From surviving documents we know that the development of theories, especially of the normative design theories, has not always been an undisturbed, steady progress. Instead, there have been many upheavals on its road from antiquity until our time. Inherited doctrines have been several times replaced with new ones and many venerable professionals have eventually lost their authority. Such state of things is, of course, not uncommon in research activity. Fundamental revisions of theories have occurred, even successively, in the history of many branches of science. Some historians of science believe that revolutions belong to the normal and even inevitable development of any branch of science. These researchers think that there are recurring patterns, "laws of evolution" that most sciences follow. A famous presentation of some them is given by Thomas Kuhn in the book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.

Preparadigmatic Phase

Each science that we know today has begun with a chaos of isolated suggestions by solitary authors. Today we would call these suggestions "hypotheses" and we would expect them to be tested and become either accepted or rejected. However, in their time there were few means to test the validity of these hypotheses because of the absence of scientific methodology. Those hypotheses that (as we now know) would have been most fruitful for scientific development were not selected as the basis of subsequent study more often than the bad ones. In other words, research was not self correcting but continued in haphazard directions as long as resources could be found for such futile work.

This "preparadigmatic" confusion was destined to last until the first researcher was able to create so extensive theoretical models that they covered not only his own findings but also those of some other researchers, and this new theory gained general acceptance. If practical applications could be expected from the new theory, it would also boost its acceptance and help finding the finances for further work; however before 18 century practical benefits from science were seldom expected.

An often quoted example of the preparadigmatic phase of science was the era of alchemy which ended only in 17 century with the advent of the earliest reliable theories of chemistry. Another example is given by Kuhn (p.13). He describes the situation in optics before Isaac Newton gave this science its first durable basis:

"Being able to take no common body of belief for granted, each writer on physical optics felt forced to build his field anew from its foundations. In doing so, his choice of supporting observation and experiment was relatively free, for there was no standard set of methods or of phenomena."

The preparadigmatic period often persists for a long time because there are many obstacles in finding the first general theory for a field of science. They include:

• researchers have difficulty in deciding which facts should be gathered and studied; they often omit just those details that later scientists will find sources of important information (Kuhn, 16),
• a large proportion of collected observations are faulty because of primitive research methods,
• different men confronting the same range of phenomena interpret them in different ways (17).

Pseudo-science. Sometimes it happens that researchers in a preparadigmatic field of exploration manage to gather resources and organize themselves ostensibly like a real institution of science. For example, alchemy and astrology could in their heyday occasionally find patrons who would pay the expenses of research; today tobacco industry is such a patron to those scientists that can find evidence against the dangers of tobacco. Scientology is another modern example of pseudo-science.
The proponents of pseudo-science usually declare themselves to be honest scientists; however the distinction to real science can easily be seen by noting the following characteristic traits of pseudo-science:

• Pseudo-science relies heavily on authority. The dogma given by the canonized masters must not be criticized. It is also forbidden to empirically test its validity. If tests are made by outsiders their results will be disregarded.
• The hypotheses and theories of pseudo-science are often formulated so that it is impossible to test them empirically.
• Each pseudo-science uses a set of its own research methods. These are seldom developed and no attempt is made to increase their self-correcting power.
• The theory of each pseudo-science is distinct from all other theories. ("Languages and religions are necessarily rivals, but sciences are necessarily allies" -- a remark by Santayana, p. 267.)
• In pseudo-science exact definitions and mathematical models are avoided. (This list, modified, comes from Tuomela, p. 126).

One could think that because most findings of arteology become quickly verified by practice there is little risk of pseudo-science. Alas, the reverse is true. This is due to the very practicality of arteology: in modern times it still is possible to create many simple types of artifacts like buildings or furniture without relying on theory and using traditional methods: by iteration, by relying on exemplars and inherited skills and by intuitive artistic creation. As a consequence, it is also possible to present nonsense as design theory, without too much risk of getting punished for it. Brilliant instances of this can easily be found (to mention only one field) among phenomenological writings on architecture.

Maturation of a New Branch of Science

Creation of an independent and operational paradigm marks the turning point on the road to new science. This road is always a collective process of several researchers and it entails normally the following advancements in generally applied practices of study:

• The researchers of a given topic have to develop a reliable method for testing proposed findings and for judging which of them can be accepted as the basis for further study.
• In informative research this means verification of hypotheses where the crucial question is: Do they faithfully describe the object of study?
• In design science there is an additional criterion, utility: Does the new proposal promote those goals and ends that are generally approved in the field?

"Generally approved" does not mean "approved by the experts" as is the case in pseudo-science; here it means instead "approved by the consumers" (or customers).
• The number of researchers and of their investigations should exceed a certain amount, "a critical mass". This is not a logical necessity but a practical one. A solitary researcher, or a small group of them, can investigate the object from a few aspects but a comprehensive view is possible only when there are many studies by independent researchers. This at once creates the problem of incoherence: the earliest, solitary findings can only seldom reinforce each other.

The initial problem of insufficient coherence usually disappears when the number of separate investigations grows. This is due to the widespread practice of researchers: they normally adopt from each other concepts, definitions, and methods of measurement and analysis. This automatically creates more and more bridges between the initially separate findings and their relations to each other begin to unfold.
• The decisive criterion of maturity for a branch of science is that it must be something greater and more powerful than just a collection of findings. A decisive proof of this would certainly be the appearance of a general model which would explain all the important phenomena in the object of study or at least many of them. This universal model would include several or all the central hypotheses in the field. Often cited examples of such general models are the theory of gravitation by Newton and the one of relativity by Einstein.

However, few sciences can today proudly present such single monolithic theories. Instead of them, there are normally a number of smaller theories that fit well together and provide together the general cohesion that keeps the field of science in one piece. This alternative works quite well in practice; the only disadvantage is that it is difficult to get a comprehensive view on the field.

The process of amalgamation of initially separate scientific theories has been studied by many historians of science, among others by George Santayana (p. 267) who attributes the original idea of scientific unity to Heraclitus: "Men asleep live each in his own world, but awake they live in the same world together" ... "Languages and religions are necessarily rivals, but sciences are necessarily allies." ... Besides, Santayana describes the process in a beautiful parable:

"A geographer in China and one in Babylon may at first make wholly unlike maps; but in time both will take note of the Himalayas, and the side each approaches will slope up to the very crest approached by the other."

Is Arteology a Mature Science?

Or is it only taking shape -- note that even the name "Arteology" cannot yet be found in dictionaries? This question can be answered by studying the above presented list of the typical stages in the evolution of an emerging field of science.

According to the list, the first necessity for science is a reliable system for hypothesis testing. In the design science this testing includes two essential examinations:

1. Verification of descriptive hypotheses. These methods are mostly common to all the empirical sciences. This requirement is therefore satisfied in arteology in as high a degree as in any other science.
2. Utility evaluation. The principle and methods of utility evaluation have sometimes been condemned as inferior and "non-objective" by researchers of disinterested sciences where these methods are not used. It is to be admitted that earlier the methods of evaluation relied too much on the tradition of art criticism, i.e. on the judgement of experts, which often was quite biased as compared to the general opinion. As a contrast, usual modern methods are based on well established survey techniques used in sociology, and they give quite reliable results.

The second and third points in the maturation of a new science aim at securing that there is sufficient coherence between the separate findings. Concerning the various paradigms of design theories for artifacts this cohesion is provided by the following common elements:

• the concepts of "artifact" and "product" are basically common to all the sub-theories even if the tangible objects of study differ,
• those attributes of artifacts that can be objectively measured are common to most types of products. Examples are:
  • physical dimensions, weight,
  • capacity, power, effect,
  • price, cost,
  • strength, durability, span of life,
  • the users of the products.
• similar methods are used in the research and development of various artifacts,
• the sub-theories share a small number of approaches which are used in the study of all types of artifacts. They are based on the most usual goals that artifacts are expected to attain. They include:
• usability, utility, function
• beauty, aesthetics
• meaning, message
• ecology, impact to environment
• economy, value, price
• safety.

On the basis of the above assessment we can conclude that for producing reliable and consistent theory, arteology possesses no less effective methods than most other sciences. It is thus to be judged as a mature science.

Observe that most of the criteria for assessment that we used above have their origins in the field of informative studies and they are therefore not always very favourable for normative sciences. If we had given more weight to the criteria typical for normative studies, i.e. to utility, arteology had easily beaten many venerated disinterested sciences.

Normal Science And Revolution Of Science

Revolutions in Informative Sciences

The progress in most sciences does not advance in uniform speed. On the contrary, it often happens that several great discoveries are made during a short interval, after which the progress gradually slows down and no spectacular findings turn up for a long time. This frequently occurring pattern has been cleverly explained by Thomas Kuhn who has also given names to these two alternating phases of research: normal science and scientific revolution.

During the period of normal science the scientists cultivate an existing paradigm which includes those theoretical concepts that most scientists in this field approve. They pertain to the basic nature of the objects of study and how they shall be viewed, approached and measured; research methods; models that describe or explain the phenomena; the accumulated bank of data.

In normal-scientific research the areas of study and of theory grow steadily, but this is done cautiously: most scientists prefer to articulate those phenomena and theories that the paradigm already supplies (Kuhn p.24).

As long as the paradigm functions satisfactorily, scientists do not aim to invent new theories, and they are often intolerant of the theories proposed by others. This seemingly conservative tactic has a rational explanation: it improves the productivity of research.

"More than one theoretical construction can always be placed upon a given collection of data. History of science indicates that, particularly in the early developmental stages of a new paradigm, it is not even very difficult to invent such alternates. But that invention of alternates is just what scientists seldom undertake except during the pre-paradigm stage of their science's development and at very special occasions during its subsequent evolution. So long as the tools a paradigm supplies continue to prove capable of solving the problems it defines, science moves fastest and penetrates most deeply through confident employment of those tools. The reason is clear. As in manufacture so in science -- retooling is an extravagance to be reserved for the occasion that demands it" (Kuhn p.76).

The productivity of normal science that Kuhn speaks of, means apparently such things as the yearly number of theses, of published pages and of reciprocal references to publications -- in other words, productivity as measured from inside the scientific community. High productivity of this kind is typical of government-financed research institutions which can often select the problems to be studied so that they can do research on the basis of earlier models and perhaps also repeat the approaches of earlier investigations.

Note, however, that productivity is not always equal to efficiency as measured from outside the scientific community, not to speak of the utility of research publications. For example, aesthetics, the study of art and beauty, has now continued over 2000 years, but are we getting today more beautiful works of art with its help?

Anyway, the normal science mode of study continues in most fields from generation to generation and its theory grows consistently. Eventually it can turn out that there are some anomalies, i.e. empirical cases which are in conflict with the paradigm. The normal strategy then is to inspect if existing theory could be adjusted to conform to these anomalies; if this is impossible the normal routine is to leave the disturbing anomalies in peace as unsolved problems, for the moment. The old paradigm will not be rejected just for the reason that there are some anomalies.

"Once it has achieved the status of paradigm, a scientific theory is declared invalid only if an alternate candidate is available to take its place ... The decision to reject one paradigm is always simultaneously the decision to accept another" (Kuhn, 77).

In informative sciences a change of paradigm, which Kuhn calls scientific revolution is possible only when there is available a new theory in concord with all the evidence, including the anomalies and also all those instances which were covered by the old theory. Even then, the revolution is not over at once -- it is not uncommon that established scholars in the field of study stick quite a while to the old paradigm in the hope of preserving their authority.

In the research of artifacts no swift and spectacular revolutions have occurred, but a similar albeit gradual process was experienced during the 19 century, when the old Platonian doctrine on beauty as an attribute of objects lost popularity and younger researchers started to support Baumgarten's newer theory of 'beauty' as a peculiar mechanism in subjective perception.

Revolutions in Design Sciences

Above, it was found that need for revolution in a field of informative science arises when the credibility of the old paradigm is falling, that is, if it seems that a new proposal for theory could give a better description or explanation for the object of study.
As a contrast, in normative sciences the value criterion of a paradigm is not so much credibility but rather utility: the results that can be achieved when applying the theory into practice. Utility includes here all the desirable attributes of artifacts like usability, beauty, meaning, message, as well their ecological and economical values.
More correctly, it is not the attributes themselves but how they are evaluated by people in society, that gives the decisive verdict in the assessment of design theories.

Because human societies change continually, the utility value of a given proposal for design theory varies in time and it is normal that after major social changes in society also the prevailing paradigms of design lose their charms and people begin to long for a change in the trend of design. It is possible that even the principal goal of design will be changed, which will at once be mirrored in subsequent products as a set of new features, a new style of design.

An excellent example from the historical development of design theories and design styles can be found in the history of European architecture. Its styles as well as its theories are well documented from antiquity until our time (cf. Theory of Architecture).

Dominant goal of architecture and of its design theory:	Founder of the paradigm of theory:	Style of architectural design:
Beauty	Vitruve	Doric, Ionian and Corinthian styles
Religious salvation	St.Augustine	The Gothic style
Beauty (the classical goals were revived)	L.B.Alberti	Renaissance, baroque, rococo, neoclassical style
Individualism	Viollet-le-Duc	l'Art Nouveau and other personal styles like Gaudi's
Utility	Le Corbusier	Functionalism
Economy of building	F.W.Taylor	No-name cheap element building

The table on the right shows six consecutive periods of European architecture which are characterized by changes of paradigm, in theory as well as in style. Both the architectural styles and the dominant design theories of these periods are incompatible with other periods (excepting that renaissance adopted some of the theories of antiquity). All five paradigm changes have been caused by fundamental shifts in people's prevailing preferences regarding the goals of building.

Although in technology there can be no design without theory, in other words new theory must always precede new design, in arts the connection is loose. An artifact can be designed in hours, while research takes months, therefore it is normal that researchers cannot at once produce the new theory that would meet the customers' new needs. Instead an artist more talented than others can succeed creating intuitively a new product that fulfills the new demands.

This artifact then becomes the { exemplar that defines the new fashion of design, at least for some time ahead, until a design theory based on more extensive research eventually appears. In the diagram on the left, red dots mark the exemplars that show the way for the normal and conventional works that follow (black dots), and that in turn indicate the general trend of design and in time also the main line of theory. As the diagram shows, the exemplars are often a little bit, but not too much, off the main road of development. Besides, there are usually a few extremist artists and their works (blue dots) that fail in getting understanding and approval, and who thus remain as historical curiosities.

If you want to make this kind of study, you can select for the dimension x in the diagram any characteristic of the artefacts that you think is important in the change of styles that you are studying.

Future of Arteology

Above we found that arteology, to some extent at least, follows the general model that Kuhn and others have discovered in the evolution of sciences. Now it is a common property of explaining-type models that you can use them to forecast even the future development of the object that was being studied - with the risk of miscalculation, of course. Anyway, it can be of interest to try to speculate on probable trends in the world of design and of its theory. Are we approaching new scientific or stylistic revolutions, or shall the development continue as a peaceful evolution?

New fashions of design shall certainly appear in accelerating tempo as long as the industry has expanding resources for consulting designers, and as long as managers believe that the public wants continually new models.

However, regarding the development of theory we can expect that the latter, peaceful alternative continues in the foreseeable future. The reason is that there is now so much research going on in every field of production that any new appearing problem resulting from changes outside the design profession has good chances to get appropriate attention at once. Another factor that helps keeping problems away is our excellent world-wide information system which distributes swiftly all theoretical advancements.

Unsolved problems will thus not likely get accumulated into a bundle that could be rectified only with a full-scale revolution. The situation will not be as difficult as it was in Alberti's or Viollet-le-Duc's time (see above), who were forced to make a revolution because they had too many problems to solve at once, being the first pioneers in their field after an interval with no competent research lasting for several generations.

Types of artifacts (examples)	Approach of study:
Works of art	x	xx	xx	...	...	x
Clothes	xx	xx	xx	x	x	xx
Furniture	xx	xx	x	x	x	xx
Buildings	xx	x	x	xx	x	xx
etc.	...	...	...	...	...	...

If the development now continues in the normal-science manner it will mean that those theoretical patterns that until now have been used successfully will be applied on new areas. Arteology is an applied science which means that it will mostly expand in those areas where theory is needed for practical purposes. Now the industrial production system in most countries is constantly introducing new types of products, and the trend seems to continue. To support the design of these new products new product-specific design theories are needed. As a contrast, new goal-specific design theories need be created relatively seldom, because already the existing theories (the last six columns of the table on the right) cover most of those types of human dreams and desires that products can satisfy. If we would enlarge the table so that it contained all existing design theories, we would thus continuously need to add new rows to it, but new columns not so often.

May 4, 2005. Original location: http://www2.uiah.fi/projects/metodi
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